RICHARD J. LEON, District Judge.
Plaintiff, Frederick Schlottman ("Schlottman"), brings this action against Hilda L. Solis, in her official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Labor (the "defendant"), seeking damages pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., for discrimination and retaliation. Before the Court is the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record herein, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiff was hired by the Department of Labor in April 2008 as a Legislative Analyst. Compl. ¶ 7. On July 20, 2008, in a letter to his supervisor, plaintiff complained that his Division Chief was creating a hostile work environment, and on September 30, 2008, he criticized his Division Chief in a report. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. On January 15, 2009, while still a probationary employee, plaintiff received a removal notice, advising him that he was being terminated for unsatisfactory performance effective January 31, 2009. Id. ¶ 11 Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 3; Def.'s Ex. 1, Notice of Termination During Probation Period, at 1. The removal notice stated that plaintiff had the right to challenge his termination if he believed it was based on political
On January 31, 2009, Schlottman filed with the Office of the Special Counsel ("OSC") a whistleblower complaint, which was dismissed on April 6, 2009 for failure to allege action protected by the Whistleblower Protection Act ("WPA"). Compl. ¶¶ 13 & 14. On June 4, 2009 Schlottman appealed the OSC determination to the MSPB and filed a "mixed case" appeal, alleging his termination involved reprisal for both whistleblowing and discrimination.
On April 20, 2011, Schlottman initiated the instant action seeking reinstatement and back pay, compensatory damages and attorneys' fees for relief from discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compl. ¶¶ 1 & 2.
Defendant moves to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff alleges that he properly exhausted his administrative remedies and timely filed a mixed case appeal. Compl. ¶¶ 12-22; Pl.'s Opp'n at 8-17. Defendant argues that plaintiff did not file a mixed case appeal, but even if he did, his claims were not preserved by the savings clause because the appeal was not timely. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 6-10; Def.'s Reply at 1-4. Plaintiff counters that defendant failed to properly inform him of his rights to appeal. Pl.'s Opp'n at 17-20. Despite these arguments, this Court finds that under any scenario, plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies, and therefore, his claims must be dismissed.
Before suing under Title VII in district court, an aggrieved party must exhaust his administrative remedies. See Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C.Cir.1997) (citing Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976)). Plaintiff had two administrative channels to challenge his termination as discriminatory. He could file an EEO complaint with the Department of Labor alleging "discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16; 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a). If a plaintiff elects to proceed in this forum, he first must file an informal complaint with his employment agency within forty-five days of the effective date of the challenged action, and then, if notified by the agency of his right to do so, file a formal complaint within fifteen days after notification. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(a)-(b). Alternatively, plaintiff had the right to directly appeal his termination to the MSPB challenging his termination as based on marital status or political activities, or on grounds of improper procedure, while simultaneously challenging the termination as discriminatory. 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b)-(d). If a plaintiff elects this second option, he must file his direct appeal within thirty days of the effective date of the challenged action. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a). Either way, however, plaintiff must fully and timely exhaust all administrative remedies within that option. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b); Wilson v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 759 F.Supp.2d 55, 63 (D.D.C.2011). Unfortunately for Schlottman, even taking as true all of the allegations in his complaint, his claims must be dismissed as untimely.
Schlottman did not file a formal EEO complaint until September 17, 2009, four months after the May 16, 2009 deadline to file expired. Similarly, Schlottman missed the deadline to file an MSPB discriminatory appeal by not filing the appeal until June 4, 2009, three months after the March 2, 2009 deadline. Schlottman, however, alleges that he timely exhausted his administrative remedies because he filed a "mixed case appeal," preserving his claims under the "savings clause" of the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C.
Under the CSRA, a "mixed case" is defined as "an adverse personnel action subject to appeal to the MSPB coupled with a claim that the action was motivated by discrimination." Butler v. West, 164 F.3d 634, 638 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7702). A "mixed case appeal" is
29 C.F.R. 1614.302(a)(2). Under the CSRA savings provision, "when an employee files his or her mixed-case appeal in a timely manner, but with the wrong agency, the proper agency must treat the appeal as having been timely filed there." Frank v. Ridge, 310 F.Supp.2d 4, 9 (D.D.C.2004) (citing Miller v. Dep't of Army, 987 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed.Cir.1993)), aff'd sub nom. Frank v. Chertoff, 171 Fed. Appx. 860 (D.C.Cir.2005).
Here, even assuming that plaintiff filed a mixed case appeal with the MSPB, the savings provision does not apply because it requires that the mixed case appeal be timely filed. Since neither plaintiff's appeal to the MSPB nor his appeal to the EEOC was timely filed, his case must be dismissed.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An Order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.